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Perlin et al.: Lawyers and Expert Witnesses

“SOME THINGS ARE TOO HOT TO TOUCH”:
COMPETENCY, THE RIGHT TO SEXUAL AUTONOMY, AND
THE ROLES OF LAWYERS AND EXPERT WITNESSES
Michael L. Perlin,* Alison J. Lynch** & Valerie R. McClain***
I.

INTRODUCTION

For nearly the last five years, Bob Dylan has begun each night’s
set with his Oscar-winning song, Things Have Changed (from the
movie, The Wonder Boys). It includes this verse:
I’ve been walking forty miles of bad road
If the bible is right, the world will explode
I’ve been trying to get as far away from myself as I can
Some things are too hot to touch
The human mind can only stand so much
You can’t win with a losing hand1
What does it mean? That is often an unanswerable question
when it comes to Bob’s lyrics. But perhaps this is a clue: When Bob

Portions of this paper were presented at the 4th Annual International Workshop on Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, St. Thomas University School of Law, Miami Gardens, FL, January 2018, and
at the annual meeting of the American College of Forensic Psychology, San Diego, CA, April
2018.
* Michael L. Perlin, Esq., Adjunct Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law;
Professor Emeritus of Law, Founding Director, International Mental Disability Law Reform
Project, Co-founder, Mental Disability Law and Policy Associates, New York Law School.
** Alison J. Lynch, Esq., Disability Rights New York.
*** Valerie R. McClain, Psy.D., Licensed Psychologist.
1 Things Have Changed, BOB DYLAN, http://bobdylan.com/songs/things-have-changed/
(last visited Dec. 2, 2018). One of the co-authors (MLP) has used the song title once before.
See Michael L. Perlin, “Things Have Changed:” Looking at Non-Institutional Mental
Disability Law Through the Sanism Filter, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 535 (2002-03). When MLP
most recently saw Dylan in Dec. 4, 2018, this remained the opening song. See Michael Perlin,
Review, BOB LINKS (Dec. 3, 2018), http://www.boblinks.com/120318r.html#3 (discussing the
role of this song as the set list opener).
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received his Oscar for this song,2 he said in his acceptance speech, “[It
is] a song that doesn’t pussyfoot around nor turn a blind eye to human
nature.”3 Consider the line used in this article’s title and the next one—
“Some things are too hot to touch / The human mind can only stand so
much.” When we decided to write this paper, this is the song that
exploded in our minds. Because the topic about which we are writing
is “too hot” for most of us “to touch.” And when we try to take it
seriously, unfortunately, we learn quickly that “The human mind can
only stand so much.”
One of the co-authors (MLP) started talking and writing about
sex and disability to professional audiences over 25 years ago,4 and
was immediately struck by the intense interest shown in the topic,
especially on the part of staff—professional and otherwise—at state
forensic hospitals.5 From the beginning of this venture, it was clear
that there were multiple (and contradictory) responses: on occasion,
questions from the audience went on for longer than the talk took to
present;6 on other occasions, there were no questions at all. Sometimes
the responses were, there is no other word for it, stupefying.7
2 See Oscars, “Things Have Changed” Wins Original Song: 2001 Oscars, YOUTUBE (Jan.
8, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LOSD7iOEtq0.
3 Id.; Tony Attwood, Things Have Changed: The Meanings Behind Bob Dylan’s Song,
UNTOLD DYLAN (Nov. 16, 2008), http://bob-dylan.org.uk/archives/17.
4 See Michael L. Perlin, Hospitalized Patients and the Right to Sexual Interaction: Beyond
the Last Frontier?, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 517 (1993-94).
5 Two of the co-authors (MLP & AJL) discuss this extensively in MICHAEL L. PERLIN &
ALISON J. LYNCH, SEXUALITY, DISABILITY, AND THE LAW: BEYOND THE LAST FRONTIER? 1-2
(2016).
6 The initial presentation clearly tapped a hidden issue that screamed out for debate. The
audience was composed of forensic mental health professionals who worked at the maximumsecurity hospital where the talk was given, including psychiatrists, psychologists, nurses,
allied therapists, therapy aides, hospital administrative staff, and a few lawyers who frequently
represented Kirby patients. On the differing attitudes on the part of varying professionals on
the questions discussed here, see Michael L. Commons, Judi T. Bohn, Lisa T. Godon, Mark J.
Hauser & Thomas G. Gutheil, Professionals’ Attitudes Towards Sex Between Institutionalized
Patients, 46 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 571 (1992).
7 When the same co-author presented on this topic to a public audience at the Florida Mental
Health Institute (part of the University of South Florida in Tampa) some years ago, an audience
member (from the general public) leapt to his feet, and denounced him: “Professor Perlin, you
are an agent of the devil!” At a New York City hospital presentation, a nurse folded her arms
across her chest, and announced, “Professor, you are the very embodiment of evil!” A nurse
at a New Jersey state hospital told him that “God explicitly forbids what you are talking about,”
the nurse adding that he would “pray for [MLP’s] soul.” See Michael L. Perlin, “Limited in
Sex, They Dare”: Attitudes Toward Issues of Patient Sexuality, 26 AM. J. FORENSIC
PSYCHIATRY 25, 38 (2005). Alternatively, audience members attending presentations in which
MLP has addressed the topic, have commented—often in graphic language—that this
endeavor is largely unprecedented and much needed, in spite of the fact that the presentation
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This all must be contextualized in the ways that sanism8
permeates the law and law teaching:
I was sitting at my faculty lunch table, and conversation
turned to upcoming presentations that we would soon
be doing. My colleagues mostly take left-liberal
positions on a wide variety of issues, and are
generically the exact mix of retro ‘60s generationists
and early baby boomers that you’d expect. They
(appropriately) are quick to criticize any behavior that
is racist, sexist, ethnically bigoted or homophobic.
Rush Limbaugh would probably view them as one of
his worst “politically correct” horror fantasies. As you
might expect, I’m not terribly out of place in this group
....
[W]hen it got to be my turn, I said that I was going to
be speaking about the right of institutionalized mentally
disabled persons to sexual interaction. All conversation
came to a screeching halt. “Michael, are you serious?”
“Are you crazy (sic)?” “Michael, even for you, you’ve
gone too far!” “What are you going to say next: that
they can get married?!?”9 Et cetera.10
And more . . . .
I must admit that I was stunned—not by the response (I
spend lots of time in places where few people agree
with me about anything) so I don’t expect (or want)
agreement with whatever it is I’m talking about, but by
the identity and background of the people who were
uttering these sentiments. As I’ve said, these were
classic New York liberals, many of whom had spent
much of their distinguished professional, academic and
personal lives rooting out and exposing prejudiced and
stereotypical behavior toward virtually every minority
has delved into an area previously considered deviant and unacceptable, as the topic was seen
as so forbidden and transgressive. See PERLIN & LYNCH, supra note 5, at 10 (“[T]he whole
idea of persons with mental disabilities having sex is transgressive.” (emphasis in original)).
8 See infra note 21 and accompanying text.
9 This was said by a prominent gay rights’ activist.
10 Michael L. Perlin, “You Have Discussed Lepers and Crooks”: Sanism in Clinical
Teaching, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 683, 714 (2003) (alteration in original).
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group one could imagine. The buck, though, stopped
there.11
We have begun this way because we think it is impossible to
unpack the specific legal issues that are at the heart of this article—
how we construct “competency” in cases involving sexual autonomy
and disability, and the role of lawyers and expert witnesses in such
cases—without acknowledging the controversies that the mere
discussion of these topics engender, and the level of animosity and fury
that this topic brings out. The problem is that we begin with the initial
presenting problem of conflicting stereotypes:12
Society tends to infantilize the sexual urges, desires,
and needs of the mentally disabled. Alternatively, they
are regarded as possessing an animalistic
hypersexuality, which warrants the imposition of
special protections and limitations on their sexual
behavior to stop them from acting on these “primitive”
urges. By focusing on alleged “differentness,” we deny
their basic humanity and their shared physical,
emotional, and spiritual needs. By asserting that theirs
is a primitive morality, we allow ourselves to censor
their feelings and their actions. By denying their ability
to show love and affection, we justify this disparate
treatment.13
The three of us believe that this observation is still salient, and
that it characterizes the views, not only of society in general, but of
most lawyers and mental health professionals. The idea that persons
with mental disabilities have the same right as all others to sexual
autonomy—to a free and individualized sexual life with the same
options (to have sex, to not have sex; to have sex monogamously, to
have sex polygamously; to masturbate, to not masturbate; to have
heterosexual sex, to have homosexual sex) as all others have—is still
“beyond the last frontier” for most of society.14 Of course, these
11

Id.
This is not the only area of mental disability law in which conflicting stereotypes are
presented, often in the same argument. See Michael L. Perlin, “She Breaks Just Like a Little
Girl”: Neonaticide, the Insanity Defense, and the Irrelevance of “Ordinary Common Sense”,
10 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 5 (2003).
13 Perlin, supra note 4, at 537 (footnotes omitted).
14 See PERLIN & LYNCH, supra note 5; Perlin, supra note 4. MLP and AJL present on this
topic frequently. When either of us, talking about this topic in multiple venues, merely uses
12
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attitudes ignore what has been revealed in a recent comprehensive
data-driven study: that “sexuality leads to boosts in mood and meaning
in life with no evidence for the reverse direction.”15
Our focus in this article is on the way that we globally ignore
the law and the science about competency determinations when it
comes to matters involving this population, how it is critical that both
lawyers and expert witnesses take this seriously and incorporate it into
their professional selves and how our failure to take this seriously—a
failure that is steeped in both sanism and false “ordinary common
sense”16—violates every precept of therapeutic jurisprudence
(hereinafter “TJ”),17 as well as constitutional law.18 We will
specifically consider the obligations on lawyers (to vigorously
represent these clients in court and administrative proceedings,19 and
to respond forthrightly to those who ask “how can you argue that your
client has a right to sexual interaction?”),20 and on expert witnesses
(who must put aside their own personal feelings—if they interfere—
and seek to assess individuals as objectively in this context as they
would on questions of criminal incompetency or on civil competencies
involving matters such as ability to enter into contracts). As we will
discuss subsequently, we believe that it is only through the lens of
therapeutic jurisprudence that we can bring any clarity to the issues in
question.
We begin with short definitions of “sanism” and (false)
“ordinary common sense,” as we think it is critical to keep these in
mind during this talk, and when we think about this subject. What is
sanism? It is the irrational prejudices that cause, and are reflected in,
the words “masturbation” or “polygamous,” the anger and ire from some in the audience is
often palpable.
15 See generally Todd B. Kashdan, Fallon R. Goodman, Melissa Stiksma, Cayla R. Milius
& Patrick E. McKnight, Sexuality Leads to Boosts in Mood and Meaning in Life with No
Evidence for the Reverse Direction: A Daily Diary Investigation, 18 EMOTION 563 (2018).
16 See infra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
17 See infra Part V.
18 On how our current policies also violate Supreme Court case law interpreting the
Americans with Disabilities Act, see Natalie M. Chin, Group Homes as Sex Police and the
Role of the Olmstead Integration Mandate, 42 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 379, 447 (2018)
(characterizing “sexuality as an integral aspect of community integration”).
19 See Michael L. Perlin & Naomi M. Weinstein, Said I, ‘But You Have No Choice’: Why a
Lawyer Must Ethically Honor a Client’s Decision About Mental Health Treatment Even if It
Is Not What S/he Would Have Chosen, 15 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 73 (2016).
20 Id. at 75; see also Michael L. Perlin, Heather Ellis Cucolo & Alison J. Lynch, Sex,
Sexuality, Sexual Offending and the Rights of Persons with Mental Disabilities, 6 LAWS 20
(2017).
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prevailing social attitudes toward persons who are mentally disabled,
and those so perceived. Largely invisible and largely socially
acceptable, it is based upon stereotype, myth, superstition and
deindividualization, and it is sustained and perpetuated by our use of a
false “ordinary common sense” and heuristic reasoning in our
unconscious responses to events in everyday life and the legal
process.21 We believe that “therapeutic jurisprudence can be an
effective and dramatic tool for ferreting out sanism,”22 but is essential
that we identify how sanism is at the roots of what lawyers (even
progressive lawyers whose practices involve a civil rights practice) and
judges do—often unconsciously—on a daily basis in courtrooms and
in law offices.23
“[O]rdinary common sense” (hereinafter “OCS”) is a
“‘prereflective attitude’ exemplified by the attitude of ‘What I know is
“self-evident”; it is “what everybody knows.”’”24 OCS is susceptible
to idiosyncratic, reactive decision-making that “ignores our rich,
cultural, heterogenic fabric” and substitutes “medieval conceptions of
sin, redemption, and religiosity.”25 TJ is the vehicle through which we
can best understand the pernicious power of OCS.26
21

See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON
TRIAL 21-58 (2000).
22 Michael L. Perlin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Understanding the Sanist and Pretextual
Bases of Mental Disability Law, 20 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 369, 372
(1994). See also Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, “Mr. Bad Example”: Why Lawyers
Need to Embrace Therapeutic Jurisprudence to Root out Sanism in the Representation of
Persons with Mental Disabilities, 16 WYO. L. REV. 299 (2016).
23 See Michael L. Perlin, On “Sanism”, 46 SMU L. REV. 373, 374-75 (1992) (“[S]anism is
frequently practiced, consciously or unconsciously, by individuals who regularly take liberal
or progressive positions decrying similar biases and prejudices that involve sex, race, ethnicity
or sexual orientation.”).
24 Keri K. Gould & Michael L. Perlin, “Johnny’s in the Basement/Mixing Up His
Medicine”: Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Clinical Teaching, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 339,
357 (2000) (footnotes omitted).
25 Michael L. Perlin & John Douard, “Equality, I Spoke That Word/As If a Wedding Vow”:
Mental Disability Law and How We Treat Marginalized Persons, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 9,
18 (2008-09) (discussing the public’s view of traditional substantive criminal law doctrines).
On how OCS leads individuals to come to conclusions “based disproportionately on visual
cues and clues,” see Heather Ellis Cucolo & Michael L. Perlin, Promoting Dignity and
Preventing Shame and Humiliation by Improving the Quality and Education of Attorneys in
Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) Civil Commitment Cases, 28 U. FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 291,
325-26 (2017).
26 Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, How Teaching about Therapeutic Jurisprudence
Can Be a Tool of Social Justice, and Lead Law Students to Personally and Socially Rewarding
Careers: Sexuality and Disability as a Case Example, 16 NEV. L.J. 209, 216-17 (2015). See
infra Part V.
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Consider all of this through the filter of the public “take” on the
issues we discuss here. One argument frequently made in opposition
to providing autonomy and support for sexual expression is that of
capacity: people undergoing treatment will not have the capacity to
make these decisions.27 However, this is again short-sighted, contrary
to the established law, and based on perceptions, fears and bias, rather
than facts and data. Importantly—and we have known this for
decades—it is essential that we educate mental health professionals
about the multiple issues involved in assessing sexual consent capacity
of persons with psychosocial and intellectual disabilities.28 There will
not be a “one size fits all” approach to determining whether someone
has the capacity to understand how to exercise their own sexual
autonomy in a safe way.29
This is not a topic that has received significant scholarly
attention in most quarters.30 It has entirely escaped the attention of
27 On how fact-finders rely on their own “amorphous” sense of what capacity means, see
Lawrence A. Frolik, Science, Common Sense, and the Determination of Mental Capacity, 5
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 41, 41 (1999).
28 Carrie Hill Kennedy, Assessing Competency to Consent to Sexual Activity in the
Cognitively Impaired Population, 1 J. FORENSIC NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 17, 32 (1999). See also
Robyn P. Thom, Albert J. Grudzinskas & Fabian M. Saleh, Sexual Behavior Among Persons
with Cognitive Impairments, 19 CURR. PSYCHIATRY REP. 24, 25 (2017).
29 On the special issues when patients are in long-term care, see Jennifer Hillman, Sexual
Consent Capacity: Ethical Issues and Challenges in Long-Term Care, 40 CLINICAL
GERONTOLOGIST 43 (2017). Perlin & Weinstein, supra note 19, at 99 (“[E]lderly people are
perceived as asexual, or, if interested in sex, then hypersexual to the point of perversion.”);
see also Stephanie L. Tang, When “Yes” Might Mean “No”: Standardizing State Criteria to
Evaluate the Capacity to Consent to Sexual Activity for Elderly with Neurocognitive
Disorders, 22 ELDER L.J. 449, 458 (2015); James Cook, When One Spouse Has It: Dementia
and the Permissibility of Marital Sex under Criminal Statute, 49 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1225
(2016). For contemporaneous press accounts, see Pam Belluck, Sex, Dementia and a Husband
on Trial at Age 78, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/14/health/
sex-dementia-and-a-husband-henry-rayhons-on-trial-at-age-78.html (covering an incident
where husband of wife with dementia faced criminal prosecution for third-degree felony
sexual abuse for having sex with his wife in a nursing home); Pam Belluck, Iowa Man Found
Not Guilty of Abusing Ailing Wife with Alzheimer’s, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/23/health/iowa-man-found-not-guilty-of-sexuallyabusing-wife-with-alzheimers.html (covering an incident where husband found not guilty by
the jury).
30 Jeremy Coid has argued that freedom of sexual expression should be placed at the third
level of the hierarchy of needs created by Abraham Maslow—see ABRAHAM H. MASLOW,
MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY (1954)—for detained patients along with occupation,
education, physical exercise, leisure, companionship, sense of belonging and religious
freedom, but noted that all the other aspects of this third level of the hierarchy are being
actively addressed in forensic services but that the area of sexual expression has been
neglected. Jeremy W. Coid, Quality of Life for Patients Detained in Hospital, 162 BRIT. J.
PSYCHIATRY 611, 614 (1993).
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almost all law professors.31 Often, what has been written comes from
a perspective that we can only characterize as “bizarre.” By way of
example, as recently as three years ago, an article published in a peerreviewed scientific journal began with this startling comment: “The
recognition that individuals with disabilities have a desire for sexual
relationships with other people is a relatively new concept in the
scientific community.”32
Here, it is also important to acknowledge that there are often
radically-different views held by clinical staff and ward staff on these
issues.33 A thorough study in the UK found that “discriminatory
attitudes perceived to be in operation were located in the ward staff
and were understood to be a consequence of a difference of cultural
and religious viewpoints.”34 The authors concluded that “[t]he
prohibition and regulation of sexual behaviour among patients indeed
tends to fit into a protective, conservative and moralistic discourse.”35
We have also learned that tailored sexual education—
something often entirely missing both in institutions and in the
community36—“can improve capacity to make sexuality-related
decisions” among individuals in this population.37 This flies in the face
of prevailing social attitudes of many parents and treatment providers:
there is not widespread sex education for persons with intellectual
31 The recent work of Professor Alexander Boni-Saenz and the very recent work of
Professor Jasmine Harris and Professor Natalie Chin are rare and welcome exceptions. See
e.g., Alexander A. Boni-Saenz, Sexuality and Incapacity, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1201 (2015);
Alexander A. Boni-Saenz, Sexual Advance Directives, 68 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2016); Jasmine E.
Harris, Sexual Consent and Disability, 93 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 480 (2018); Chin, supra note 18.
32 Laura Gilmour, Veronica Smith & Melike Schalomon, Sexuality and ASD: Current State
of the Research, in 1 COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO AUTISM 569 (Vinood B. Patel, Victor R.
Preedy & Colin R. Martin eds., 2014) (emphasis added), as quoted in Michael L. Perlin &
Alison J. Lynch, “All His Sexless Patients”: Persons with Mental Disabilities and the
Competence to Have Sex, 89 WASH. L. REV. 257, 258 (2014).
33 See Kalpana Elizabeth Dein, Paul Simon Williams, Irina Volkonskaia, Ava Kanyeredzi,
Paula Reavey & Gerard Leavey, Examining Professionals’ Perspectives on Sexuality for
Service Users of a Forensic Psychiatry Unit, 44 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 15, 21 (2014). In
such circumstances, the absence or ignorance of any formal policy “may permit authoritarian
perspectives to prevail while maintaining the semblance of liberal attitudes among clinicians.”
Id. at 19. See generally PERLIN & LYNCH, supra note 5, at 1-3; Perlin, supra note 4.
34 Dein et al., supra note 33, at 20.
35 Id. at 22.
36 See, e.g., C. Deshays, Sexuality in Psychiatric Institutions: Initiating Some Ethical
Reflections, 25 SEXOLOGIES e47 (2016).
37 Eileen Dukes & Brian E. McGuire, Enhancing Capacity to Make Sexuality-Related
Decisions in People with an Intellectual Disability, 53 J. INTELL. DISABILITIES RES. 727, 727
(2009).
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disabilities, in large part due to parental objections to sexual education
for their intellectually disabled children,38 because they feel their
children are not capable of understanding the information, or they feel
it would be “bad for them,” by giving them “wrong ideas” and
“overstimulat[ing] them.”39 Many parents of this population also have
succumbed to what is called the “forever child syndrome,” as a result
of which children are regarded as “eternally innocent” and asexual.40
As a result, basic information and education are often not given to
individuals with significant disabilities in regard to sexuality.41 This
will hamper their development in community settings, where
opportunities to engage in safe explorations of sexuality may arise and
this group of individuals may be unprepared because they have been
so sheltered in the name of “protection.”42
II.

COMPETENCY

So how does this play out in the context of the sexuality-related
questions—competency and the role of experts—that we seek to
address here? The following are some of the questions that MLP
regularly raised in class when he taught the right to sexual interaction
in Survey of Mental Disability Law:


“Does it make a difference if we are discussing
monogamous heterosexual sex, polygamous
heterosexual sex, monogamous homosexual sex,
polygamous homosexual sex, or bisexual sex?”43

38 PERLIN & LYNCH, supra note 5, at 108. See also Thom, Grudzinskas & Saleh, supra note
28, on the significance of the limited sexual education typically made available to persons with
intellectual disabilities.
39 LYDIA FEGAN, ANNE RAUCH & WENDY MCCARTHY, SEXUALITY AND PEOPLE WITH
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 11 (1993).
40 Elizabeth J. Reed, Criminal Law and the Capacity of Mentally Retarded Persons to
Consent to Sexual Activity, 83 VA. L. REV. 799, 804 (1997) (quoting Winifred Kempton &
Emily Kahn, Sexuality and People with Intellectual Disabilities: A Historical Perspective, 9
SEXUALITY & DISABILITY 93, 94-97 (1991)).
41 PERLIN & LYNCH, supra note 5, at 108 (citing Holly Ann Wade, Discrimination, Sexuality
and People with Significant Disabilities: Issues of Access and the Right to Sexual Expression
in the United States, 22 DISABILITY STUD. Q. 9 (2002)).
42 Compare Robert E. Freeman-Longo, Reducing Sexual Abuse in America: Legislating
Tougher Laws or Public Education and Prevention, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 303, 320-21 (1997) (discussing how sex education for adolescent abusers and
would-be abusers may deter future child sexual abuse).
43 PERLIN & LYNCH, supra note 5, at 140.
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“Should erotic or pornographic material be made
available to patients?”44
 “Should a patient’s decision to engage in what is
sometimes perceived as ‘deviant’ sexual behavior
subsequently be used as evidence of their danger
either to self or others or of ‘grave disability’?”45
 “How should ‘competency’ be assessed in the
context of patients’ ability to consent to sexual
activity?”46
 “To what extent are international human rights
instruments of significance in assessing the extent
to which institutionalized patients can exercise a
right to sexual autonomy?”47
These are all important questions, and at the core of all of them
is the question of competency. For if a patient is competent to engage
in autonomous decisionmaking about questions of sex, how can any
institutional caretaker preempt those decisions any more than the State
can preempt decisions we make about all of this in our own lives?
We are immediately faced with an important dilemma.48 It is
clear there is no unitary definition of competency in this area. Often,
there are no definitions, and when there are definitions, they are often
circular and contradictory.49 “Where policies do exist, they are often
stigmatizing and marginalizing, and do not allow for the range of
opportunities to engage in sexual activities afforded to those without
mental disabilities.”50
Importantly, we reject the notion that
incompetency can be presumed; the law presumes that mentally ill
persons are competent, unless proven otherwise in a court of law.51
44

Id.
Id.
46 Perlin & Lynch, supra note 26, at 220.
47 Id.
48 See generally Michael L. Perlin, Heather Ellis Cucolo & Alison J. Lynch, A TJ Approach
to Mental Disability Rights Research, in THE METHOD AND PRACTICE OF THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE (Nigel Stobbs, Michel Vols & Lorana Bartels eds., forthcoming 2019).
49 Perlin & Lynch, supra note 22, at 300. On competence issues in general, see MICHAEL
L. PERLIN, PAMELA CHAMPINE, HENRY DLUGACZ & MARY CONNELL, COMPETENCE IN THE
LAW: FROM LEGAL THEORY TO CLINICAL APPLICATION (2008).
50 PERLIN & LYNCH, supra note 5, at 10.
51 See Perlin & Weinstein, supra note 19, at 76 (noting the widespread public belief that
“persons institutionalized because of mental disabilities are presumptively incompetent to
engage in autonomous decision-making”); Michael L. Perlin, Everybody Is Making Love/Or
Else Expecting Rain: Considering the Sexual Autonomy Rights of Persons Institutionalized
45
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“Contemporaneous constitutional case law and some statutory
law generally reject the idea that mental illness and incompetency can
be equated.”52 One of the basic building blocks of mental disability
law is the principle that incompetence cannot be presumed either
because of mental illness or because of a past record or history of
institutionalization.53 This reasoning is supported by the most
important contemporary research. Publications by the MacArthur
Foundation’s Network on Mental Health and the Law dramatically
conclude that mental patients are not always incompetent to make
rational decisions and that mental patients are not inherently more
incompetent than patients who are not mentally ill.54 In fact, on “any
given measure of decisional abilities, the majority of patients with
schizophrenia did not perform more poorly than other patients and
nonpatients.”55
It is apparent that there remain some serious disconnects
between public perception of “competency to engage in sex” and the
competency determinations made in the legal profession that surround
this type of behavior. While the public may frequently rely on the
routine, shock-value nature of conversations surrounding sexuality,
attorneys for individuals with mental illness who express a desire to
have sex, especially when institutionalized, have to consider the
nuances of the laws surrounding competence to make these types of
decisions.56
We must start with “the assumption that all individuals have
the capacity to consent to sexual relations,” and that the presence of a
mental disorder by itself does not mean that the individual lacks this

Because of Mental Disability in Forensic Hospitals and in Asia, 83 U. WASH. L. REV. 481,
503 (2008) (discussing the myth that “[m]entally ill individuals are presumptively incompetent
to participate in ‘normal’ activities [or] to make autonomous decisions about their lives”).
52 Michael L. Perlin & Deborah A. Dorfman, Is It More Than “Dodging Lions and Wastin’
Time?” Adequacy of Counsel, Questions of Competence, and the Judicial Process in
Individual Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 2 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 114, 120 (1996).
53 See, e.g., In re LaBelle, 728 P.2d 138, 146 (Wash. 1986).
54 Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study
(III): Abilities of Patients to Consent to Psychiatric and Medical Treatments, 19 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 149 (1995) (discussed in Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 52, at 120).
55 Id. at 169.
56 On the specific question of the long-term ramifications of “sexual competence,” see
Melissa J. Palmer, Lynda Clarke, George B. Ploubidis, Catherine H. Mercer, Lorna J. Gibson,
Anne M. Johnson, Andrew J. Copas & Kaye Wellings, Is “Sexual Competence” at First
Heterosexual Intercourse Associated with Subsequent Sexual Health Status?, 54 J. SEX RES.
91 (2017).
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capacity.57 With this as a “given,” it is first necessary to unpack the
different modes of analysis to be engaged in determining capacity and
competency, and in understanding the important distinctions between
the two concepts. Capacity “refers to an individual’s actual ability to
understand, appreciate, and form a relatively rational intention with
regard to some act”;58 however, inquiries into capacity are an
insufficient basis for decisionmaking about persons with mental
disabilities engaging in sexual interactions.59 There is no question that
a functional, rather than a diagnostic, approach to determining capacity
is now the preferable means of assessment.60
Competency is a legal assessment that varies based on the act
or decisionmaking that is being considered.61 Most famously,
dissenting in Godinez v. Moran,62 in which the Supreme Court imposed
a unitary standard of competency in criminal cases, holding that
competency to either waive counsel or plead guilty was to be assessed
by the same standard as competency to stand trial, Justice Harry
Blackmun noted archly, “A person who is ‘competent’ to play
basketball is not thereby ‘competent’ to play the violin. . . .
Competency for one purpose does not necessarily translate to
competency for another purpose.”63
Importantly, the Supreme Court subsequently receded from the
rigidity of the Godinez holding in Indiana v. Edwards,64 ruling that the
right of self-representation was not absolute, and the State could insist

57

MENTAL WELFARE COMMISSION OF SCOTLAND, CONSENTING ADULTS? GUIDANCE FOR
PROFESSIONALS AND CARERS WHEN CONSIDERING RIGHTS AND RISKS IN SEXUAL
RELATIONSHIPS INVOLVING PEOPLE WITH A MENTAL DISORDER 4 (2007).
58 Steven B. Bisbing, Competency and Capacity: A Primer, in LEGAL MEDICINE 325
(Shafeek S. Sanbar ed., 7th ed. 2007).
59 Andreas Dimopoulos, Let’s Misbehave: Intellectual Disability and Capacity to Consent
to Sex 1 (Sept. 1, 2012) (unpublished paper presented to Society of Legal Scholars),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2332259.
60 Glynis H. Murphy & Ali O’Callaghan, Capacity of Adults with Intellectual Disabilities
to Consent to Sexual Relationships, 34 PSYCHOL. MED. 1347 (2004).
61 See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN, PAMELA R. CHAMPINE, HENRY A. DLUGACZ & MARY
A. CONNELL, COMPETENCE IN THE LAW: FROM LEGAL THEORY TO CLINICAL APPLICATION
(2008).
62 509 U.S. 389 (1993).
63 Id. at 412 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). On the need to consider competencies in matters
of sexuality as a distinct area of inquiry, see Oana Georgiana Girlescu, Sexuality and
Disability: An Assessment of Practices under the Convention for the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities 64 (2012) (unpublished thesis, Central European University),
http://www.etd.ceu.hu/2013/girlescu_oana.pdf.
64 554 U.S. 164 (2008).
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that an attorney be appointed to represent a mentally ill defendant even
though he had been found competent to stand trial. In the course of
the Edwards decision, it characterized the issue in a multitextured way
that should be taken seriously in any consideration of the issues under
consideration in this article, holding that “[m]ental illness itself is not
a unitary concept. It varies in degree. It can vary over time. It
interferes with an individual’s functioning at different times in
different ways.”65
It is also important here to seek to assess the extent to which a
person can exercise informed consent. In the context of this inquiry,
such consent encompasses:


An individual’s ability to understand the sexual
nature of an act, and to understand that participation
in such an act must be voluntary;
 An individual’s understanding of the potential
consequences and implications of the decision to
engage in a sexual act; and
 An individual’s ability to communicate a decision
in an overt manner as to whether he or she wishes
to engage in such an activity.66
Besides an assessment of legal capacity, attorneys must also
take into account clinical capacity. This is frequently when attorneys
and experts will need to work together to understand the standards of
competency from the other’s perspective, in order to build a strong
case for the client. This is made more troublesome by the reality that
it is often difficult to establish “clinical” competency, for those persons
who are institutionalized. There is no standard that clinicians regularly
apply when determining competency; in fact, it is an extraordinarily
fluid determination.67
In a survey of institutions’ views on their ability to handle
ethical concerns of patient sexual expression, the sociologist Eric
Wright and his colleagues found, “aside from formal legal declarations
65 Id. at 175-76. See, e.g., Cucolo & Perlin, supra note 25, at 313-14 (discussing Edwards
in this context).
66 Suzanne Doyle, The Notion of Consent to Sexual Activity for Persons with Mental
Disabilities, 31 LIVERPOOL L. REV. 111, 117-18 (2010); see also Martin Lyden, Assessment of
Sexual Consent Capacity, 25 SEXUALITY & DISABILITY 3 (2007); Paul R. Abramson, Terry
Gross & Annaka Abramson, Consenting to Sex and Severe Mental Illness: Terra Incognita
and a Priest with AIDS, 30 SEXUALITY & DISABILITY 357, 363 (2012).
67 Niswonger v. State, No. 60419, 2013 WL 285594, *1 n.2 (Nev. Jan. 23, 2013).
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of incompetence, establishing competence to engage in sexual activity
during treatment is further complicated by the dynamic nature of
psychiatric symptoms, variation in patients’ sexuality-related
knowledge and experience, and institutional policies.”68 In this
context, it is also important to consider the reality that, in general,
“Americans and their legal systems became increasingly liberal
regarding adult sexuality and the privacy afforded private, consensual,
adult sexual relationships in the twentieth century.”69 But, in the
context of the current inquiry, the relationship between sexuality and
privacy is “directly related to assessments about . . . competence.”70
This is not to say that there are not models that could be
followed. By way of example, Murphy and O’Callaghan have created
a multi-step instrument that could be adopted by inpatient psychiatric
institutions as a guide, an instrument that could be of great aid to expert
witnesses who are asked to do evaluations in such cases. They
conclude that these are all important areas to be considered in assessing
capacity:
(1) basic sexual knowledge (e.g. of body parts, sexual
relations, and sexual acts);
(2) knowledge of the consequences of sexual relations,
including sexually transmitted diseases and pregnancy;
(3) an understanding of appropriate sexual behaviour
and the context for this;
(4) an understanding that sexual contact should always
be a matter of choice;
(5) the ability to recognize potentially abusive
situations; [and]

68 Eric R. Wright, Heather A. McCabe & Harold E. Koorman, Institutional Capacity to
Respond to the Ethical Challenges of Patient Sexual Expression in State Psychiatric Hospitals
in the United States, 7 J. ETHICS MENTAL HEALTH 1, 2 (2012). Many institutions have no
guidelines or policies at all to promote a therapeutic milieu in the context of sexual
relationships. See Sabrina Kastner & Michael Linden, Relations Between Patients in
Psychiatric and Psychotherapeutic Inpatient Care: A Literature Review and Conclusions for
Clinical Practice and Research, 18 INT’L J. PSYCHIATRY IN CLINICAL PRAC. 222 (2014). For
an earlier consideration of sexual knowledge in secure hospital settings, see Marie Quayle,
Nashater Deu & Sharon Giblin, Sexual Knowledge and Sex Education in a Secure Hospital
Setting, 8 CRIM. BEHAV. & MENTAL HEALTH 66 (1998).
69 Shelly Elimelekh, The Constitutional Validity of Circuit Court Opinions Limiting the
American Right to Sexual Privacy, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 261, 262 (2006).
70 Michael Gill, Sex Can Wait, Masturbate: The Politics of Masturbation, 15 SEXUALITIES
472, 476 (2012).
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(6) the ability to show skills of assertion in social and
personal situations and to thereby reject any unwanted
advances at a given time.71
Tragically, lawyers have traditionally presumed incompetency
in all matters that relate to their institutionalized clients,72 the latter
notwithstanding the fact that, in many jurisdictions, it is statutorily
impermissible to do precisely that.73 But it is done unthinkingly, and
virtually universally, in the context of the population considered here,
and it is clear what a “damaging message”74 this is. This, more than
anything else, leads to the confusion, dissonance and tension in this
area of law, society and personhood.
III.

THE ROLE OF LAWYERS

What about, specifically, the lawyer’s role in such cases?
Beyond simply making legal determinations about competency,
attorneys must also be mindful that another part of their responsibility
to their client—and their duty to provide zealous advocacy, “the
central ethical mandate for criminal lawyers”75—is to respect their
client’s wishes and advocate for that client’s right to sexual autonomy,
if that is a priority for the client. The courts have made clear forever:
“[t]he governing standard for the representation of [persons with
disabilities] is not the protection of their best interests, but, to the extent
possible, the zealous advocacy of their expressed preferences.”76 It is
not insignificant that the “zealous advocacy” literature in law
reviews—extensive in the case of criminal defense—is virtually absent
in the case of questions involving civil commitment to psychiatric
hospitals.77

71 Murphy & O’Callaghan, supra note 60, at 1349. From a legal perspective, see Anna
Arstein-Kerslake, Understanding Sex: The Right to Legal Capacity to Consent to Sex, 30
DISABILITY & SOC’Y 1459 (2015).
72 See generally Michael L. Perlin, “I Might Need a Good Lawyer, Could Be Your Funeral,
My Trial”: Global Clinical Legal Education and the Right to Counsel in Civil Commitment
Cases, 28 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 241 (2008).
73 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-24.2(c) (2018).
74
Eli K. Best, Atypical Actors and Tort Law’s Expressive Function, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 461,
488 (2012).
75 Abbe Smith, Burdening the Least of Us: “Race-Conscious” Ethics in Criminal Defense,
77 TEX. L. REV. 1585, 1589 (1999).
76 Gross v. Rell, 40 A.3d 240, 263 (Conn. 2012).
77 Perlin & Weinstein, supra note 19, at 93:
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As we have discussed, the representation of persons with
mental disabilities is infected by sanism, and this sanism leads to
paralytic rolelessness on the part of many persons who represent this
population.78 It can make negative case outcomes nearly inevitable,
and such outcomes are the cause of much of the frustration that befalls
those who do try to provide adequate representation in these cases.
There are several specific issues that arise when an attorney
begins representing individuals with mental illness, and frequently,
these issues are only exaggerated when the subject material is
something seen as taboo—like sexual autonomy—and even more so
when this taboo subject affects an already-marginalized group, such as
individuals with a disability, especially a mental disability. As two of
the co-authors (MLP & AJL) have previously written:
[A]ttorneys often deal ineffectively with what they
perceive as their clients’ “differentness,”79 as they are
unused to developing relationships with clients who
may be passive, frightened, inarticulate, and unaware of
their possible options. Beyond this, because a patient’s
demeanor may be different, an attorney may feel foolish
or awkward in representing such a client’s views, for
fear the judge might ascribe the views to the attorney.80
This
“differentness”
may
engender
acute
embarrassment that inevitably will diminish the scope
and quality of the attorney’s advocacy.81

It is not insignificant that the phrase “zealous advocacy” has been used in
over 2400 published cases but, when the phrase < /p “civil commitment”
“psychiatric hospitalization”> is added to a WESTLAW search, there are
zero cases to be found.
Id.
78

See Perlin & Lynch, supra note 22, at 309.
See Perlin, supra note 23, at 398 (stating “[l]egislators have traditionally responded to
socially-expressed fears by enacting laws that focus on the perceived differentness of people
with mental disabilities in almost all aspects of social intercourse”). On the role of difference
in this area in general, see generally MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE:
INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW (1990).
80 Perlin & Lynch, supra note 22, at 305. This conflict becomes more significant in light
of the court’s view of the entire process. See, e.g., Thomas K. Zander, Civil Commitment in
Wisconsin: The Impact of Lessard v. Schmidt, 1976 WIS. L. REV. 503, 516 (1976) (explaining
that 80% of surveyed Wisconsin judges endorsed “best interests” model; 12% adopted
adversary position).
81 Perlin & Lynch, supra note 22, at 305-06.
79
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Frequently, at the root of this ineffective advocacy is sanism.
Sanist lawyers (1) distrust their clients with mental disabilities, (2)
trivialize their complaints, (3) fail to forge authentic attorney-client
relationships with such clients and reject their clients’ potential
contributions to case-strategizing, and (4) take less seriously case
outcomes that are adverse to their clients.82 Sanism is dangerous
because not only does it yield these unfair, detrimental outcomes, but
it also is often unnoticed by the attorney himself, who may genuinely
believe he is providing the best possible representation to his client.
However, the attitudes and views he has internalized over the course
of his life, especially surrounding sexuality as it applies to persons with
disabilities, can lead to this insidious bias that can affect his practice.
As we will discuss soon, this is the reason why therapeutic
jurisprudence is immensely beneficial, and necessary, especially for
education of legal professionals.83
At its core, the tenets of therapeutic jurisprudence reflect the
belief that all clients deserve the dignity of voicing their opinions,
beliefs and thoughts throughout their time in the legal system.84 This
includes those taboo subjects like sexual autonomy. It is the lawyer’s
job to not only acknowledge the importance of this type of discussion,
but to use the information the client is providing in a way that furthers
that client’s dignity and voice within a system that so frequently tunes
him or her out.85
The attorney must also become comfortable with being an
educator, as well as an advocate. Frequently, for populations whose
needs are overlooked, there are not only biases against these needs, but
a lack of understanding. A TJ-oriented attorney, in consultation with
his or her clients, will work to provide information and education about
the problem. It is not enough, especially where something as “taboo”
as sexual autonomy is concerned, to just advocate. In order to bring
more comprehensive change and understanding to the issue, it is very
likely that there will need to be some education that goes along with
forceful advocacy.

82

Perlin, supra note 4, at 695.
Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler, The Use of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Law
School Clinical Education: Transforming the Criminal Law Clinic, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 605
(2006).
84 Amy D. Ronner, Songs of Validation, Voice, and Voluntary Participation: Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, Miranda and Juveniles, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 79, 94-95 (2002).
85 Id.
83
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Attorneys who agree to work with this population, on these
issues, will need to become comfortable confronting potentially
unconscious sanist biases while providing the zealous advocacy that
these clients deserve. The roles of attorneys in cases such as these
extend beyond what is taught in law school.86 The principles of
therapeutic jurisprudence are critical to understanding how best to
serve this population, especially while confronting issues that the
majority of the public will find uncomfortable.87
IV.

THE ROLE OF EXPERT WITNESSES88
A.

Introduction

Forensic experts are in a unique position to assist in cases
involving alleged sexual offenses by individuals who have been
diagnosed with intellectually disabled or autism spectrum disorder.
Opportunities to provide feedback to the courts and lawyers
representing these individuals arise frequently due to the vulnerability
of these targeted individuals both as victims and alleged perpetrators.
Psychological testing and a comprehensive review of relevant
contributing developmental factors can yield critical information that
can provide mitigation and potential solutions consistent with the goals
of therapeutic jurisprudence. The ability to intervene in the initial
phase of the entry of these targeted individuals into the criminal justice
system is particularly critical with regard to promoting ethical and
effective case dispositions that include rehabilitation.
B.

The Research

Research compiled by the ARC’s National Center on Criminal
Justice & Disability (hereinafter “NCCJD”) provides a bridge between
criminal justice and disability professionals, such as lawyers, treating

86

See Perlin & Lynch, supra note 26.
See Perlin & Lynch, supra note 22.
88 Much of this section draws on the personal experience of co-author VRMcC, who, as an
expert witness and consultant, has had frequent opportunities to evaluate individuals facing
legal consequences related to their own victimization and their own intellectual limitations,
both of which often place them at great risk for exploitation. This co-author has testified
frequently in cases involving this population in matters related to competency, restorability
and sentence mitigation, and has regularly addressed questions of culpability and intent in such
cases.
87
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therapists, psychologists and service coordinators.89 The goal of
NCCJD is to promote fairness, safety and justice for people with
intellectual and developmental disabilities (hereinafter “I/DD”) as
suspects, offenders, victims or witnesses.90 A White Paper Series
entitled “Pathways to Justice: Barriers and Solutions,”91 discusses
current issues, research and emerging practices regarding people with
intellectual and developmental disabilities in the criminal justice
system. Each paper in the series is written by an expert regarding a
particular topic relevant to the work done by forensic mental disability
professionals and lawyers who represent the population in question.
For example, Prof. Heather Ellis Cucolo and MLP address the legal
warehousing of people with I/DD charged with sexual offenses.
Essentially, the message is that citizens with disabilities have a right to
equal access to our nation’s criminal justice system.92 Relatedly, both
the criminal justice system and professionals working with those with
disabilities are encouraged to acknowledge and address areas in which
services and procedures are lacking so as to move towards enhancing
effective treatment.93
People with intellectual and developmental disabilities who
allegedly violate sex act-related laws frequently face serious
consequences, often because the law—and law enforcement—falls far
short of accommodating the disability in question. Professionals
involved in the criminal justice system must be able to identify the
disability, and they must be able to understand its consequent impact
on the individual’s behavior. Armed with this knowledge, the
professionals involved—whether forensic psychologist, other forensic
mental health professional, judge or lawyer—can both more
effectively respond by protecting the legal rights of the individual, and
by establishing strategies to mitigate both the individual’s rights, and,
in the case of the forensic mental health professional, the victims’

89

See ARC, WWW.THEARC.ORG (LAST VISITED DEC. 5, 2018).
THE ARC: NAT’L CTR. ON CRIM. JUST. & DISABILITY, JUSTICE-INVOLVED YOUTH WITH
INTELLECTUAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES: A CALL TO ACTION FOR THE JUVENILE
JUSTICE COMMUNITY (2015), https://www.thearc.org/document.doc?id=5343.
91 Pathways to Justice, ARC, https://www.thearc.org/what-we-do/programs-and-services/n
ational-initiatives/nccjd/pathways-to-justice (last visited Dec. 5, 2018).
92 Heather Ellis Cucolo & Michael L. Perlin, The Legal Warehousing of People with I/DD
Charged with Sex Offenses, in SEX OFFENDERS WITH INTELLECTUAL/DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES: A CALL TO ACTION FOR THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMMUNITY 9 (2016),
https://www.thearc.org/document.doc?id=5253.
93 Id. at 9-10.
90
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rights.
Rehabilitation and education are key components to
accomplish this balance.94
The professional must first identify the presence of I/DD so as
to proceed with related legal and treatment options to present to the
court. As we have already discussed, individuals with these disabilities
often did not—when they were children or youth—receive education
concerning sexuality, often because their parents were uncomfortable
and uncertain as to how to provide such education in a meaningful and
comprehensive manner.95
Different criminal charges will require different strategies. For
example, public masturbation should be viewed in a different light than
more serious charges such as repeated cultivated child molestation
(that is, the grooming of victims who are vulnerable being gradually
“set up” over time).96 In cases involving such serious charges, it is
important to recognize that individuals with I/DD are often susceptible
to coercion, and they may thus become implicated in criminal acts
involving sexual offenses due to being victims themselves. For
example, this examiner recently evaluated a woman who was
intellectually disabled and accused of production of child
pornography. Investigation into her background yielded important
findings including her own history of victimization at the age of 13
years old when she was gang raped. She had met her partner on an
online dating site and was groomed over time leading to two
pregnancies resulting in two daughters. The perpetrator molested the
young toddlers and was physically abusive to the client threatening to
harm her, the children and her family when she would not provide bath
time pictures which he said he was using to “make a photo album.”
Despite the client’s efforts to obtain a restraining order, the perpetrator
successfully manipulated her through verbal threats and violence
leading to her involvement in federal charges of production of child
pornography. This examiner was asked to identify developmental
factors which would contribute to her vulnerability and conduct
neuropsychological and intellectual deficits to identify the extent of
her disability. The results are still pending in the federal case.

94

NCCJD, ARC, www.thearc.org/NCCJD (last visited Dec. 5, 2018).
See, e.g., Kempton & Kahn, supra note 40, and text accompanying supra notes 36-42.
96 See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 1279, 1283 n.2 (9th Cir. 1997) (defining
grooming as “the process of cultivating trust with a victim and gradually introducing sexual
behaviors until reaching a point of intercourse”).
95
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Research indicates that treatment plans which promote
community involvement, successful employment and positive selfimages are largely more effective than those which confine and isolate
offenders and focus primarily on suppressing problem behaviors.97
For example, individuals who are found incompetent to proceed due to
I/DD can be placed in group homes which permit opportunities to
cultivate responsivity, learning style, cognitive skills and exposure to
life experiences which allow healthy sexual behavior and appropriate
outlets for sexual expression such as same aged peer relationships.98
We reject as both unconstitutional and clinically unwise the protocol
that exists in many states in which individuals currently incompetent
to stand trial are incarcerated in a maximum security forensic facility
pending restoration.99
Consider also cases involving the registration of sex
offenders.100 This examiner is frequently asked to evaluate individuals
identified as sex offenders who have I/DD and have failed to meet the
registration requirements established by law.101 In such cases, the
reality is often that limited resources to promote community
involvement including a lack of social service mechanisms to facilitate
registration combined with geographic restrictions are obstacles which
contribute to recidivism and promote social shame.102 Multiple factors
contribute to the failure of individuals with I/DD to be able to comply
with registration requirements, including a lack of basic skills such as
communication (understanding consequences, expressing needs),
THE ARC: NAT’L CTR. ON CRIM. JUST. & DISABILITY, supra note 90; see also About Safer
Society, FAY HONEY KNOPP INST., http://www.safersociety.org/foundation/about-us/ (last
visited Dec. 5, 2018).
98 See, for a review of the relevant research, Tonya N. Davis, Wendy Machalicek, Rachel
Scalzo, Alicia Kobylecky, Vincent Campbell, Sarah Pinkelman, Jeffrey Michael Chan & Jeff
Sigafoos, A Review and Treatment Selection Model for Individuals with Developmental
Disabilities Who Engage in Inappropriate Sexual Behavior, 9 BEHAV. ANALYSIS PRAC. 389
(2016).
99 See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, “For the Misdemeanor Outlaw”: The Impact of the ADA on
the Institutionalization of Criminal Defendants with Mental Disabilities, 52 ALA. L. REV. 193
(2000); Susan McMahon, Reforming Competence Restoration Statutes: An Outpatient Model,
GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3132700.
100 See MICHAEL L. PERLIN & HEATHER ELLIS CUCOLO, SHAMING THE CONSTITUTION: THE
DETRIMENTAL RESULTS OF SEXUAL VIOLENT PREDATOR LEGISLATION 43-55 (2017).
101 NCCJD, supra note 94.
102 See generally Michael L. Perlin & Naomi M. Weinstein, “Friend to the Martyr, a Friend
to the Woman of Shame”: Thinking About the Law, Shame and Humiliation, 24 S. CAL. REV.
L. & SOC. JUST. 1 (2014) (discussing sex offender laws in the context of shame); Cucolo &
Perlin, supra note 25 (same).
97
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deficits in sex education, lack of knowledge of how to seek supportive
resources (mental health counseling, drug treatment, medical care) and
moral reasoning deficits.103 Cognitive deficits in individuals with I/DD
including slowed and concrete reasoning necessitate steps in ensuring
individuals comprehend and appreciate the supervision
requirements.104
Further challenges include the necessity of repetition, impaired
verbal comprehension and reading skills, difficulties with abstraction
and generalization, tendency towards acquiescence bias and sensitivity
to criticism.105 Relatedly, professionals frequently display behaviors
which further impede communication, including infantilizing the client
due to identified I/DD, over-pathologizing the client and attributing the
behavior to sexual deviance, minimizing accountability for behavior,
ignoring risk potential and reacting disproportionately by citing
examples such as community anger towards sex offenders in the
neighborhood.106
Opportunities for rehabilitating individuals with I/DD who are
found incompetent to proceed related to sexual offenses can be
provided within the context of group homes which provide 24/7
supervision. Step-wise behavioral modification is used to promote
appropriate sexual expression and decrease the frequency of
inappropriate sexual behavior through identifying triggers and setting
appropriate interpersonal boundaries.107 In many cases, co-morbid
psychiatric disorders such as ADHD, Bipolar Disorder or
Schizophrenia which contribute to poor impulse control and impaired
perceptions are identified and treated through medication. This

103 See generally Murphy & O’Callaghan, supra note 60, at 1354 (discussing how persons
with intellectual disabilities lack knowledge about such topics as pregnancy, masturbation,
contraception, birth control, STDs, types of sexual relationships, and legal aspects of sex).
104 NCCJD, supra note 94.
105 On acquiescence bias in the context of this population, see Bradley A. Areheart,
Disability Trouble, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 347, 372-73 (2011).
106 THE ARC: NAT’L CTR. ON CRIM. JUST. & DISABILITY, supra note 90. According to
disability rights advocates, the infantilization of adults with disabilities has been a significant
rationale for stripping away autonomy. See Mitchell Levitz, Voices of Self-Advocates, in THE
HUMAN RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES: DIFFERENT BUT EQUAL 453,
458 (Stanley S. Herr, Lawrence O. Gostin & Harold Hongju Koh eds., 2003), as quoted in
János Fiala-Butora, Michael Ashley Stein & Janet E. Lord, The Democratic Life of the Union:
Toward Equal Voting Participation for Europeans with Disabilities, 55 HARV. INT’L L.J. 71,
88 n.101 (2014).
107 About Safer Society, supra note 97.
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combined therapeutic milieu helps to promote personal and sexual
autonomy and increased independence for individuals with I/DD.
Consider further individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder
as defined by the DSM-V.108 This cohort of individuals—including
those previously categorized as persons with Asperger’s—can become
involved in the criminal justice system for various reasons including
alleged sexual offenses or misconduct.109 Research exploring the
impact that the symptoms of ASD have on these alleged sexually
inappropriate behaviors is much needed to promote effective legal
outcomes. ASD is characterized by social difficulties including
deficits in verbal and non-verbal understanding and responding
appropriately in social situations and interpersonal relationships.110
Relatedly, individuals with ASD have difficulty initiating,
understanding and maintaining relationships.111 The marked features
of restrictive, repetitive and fixed patterns of behavior presents
challenges in trying to promote appropriate sexual responses and
outlets.112
For example, individuals with ASD may become fixated on a
specific person, body parts, or obsession with pornography, all of
which may result in stalking or unwanted sexual advances. This
examiner evaluated an individual with ASD who had been conditioned
with urethral electrical stimulation to regulate bladder control. This
same individual developed inappropriate behaviors including
soliciting other children to come to the restroom and urinate in front of
him. In another case, a young man who was very isolated from peers
and had no dating history, developed a pattern of viewing child
pornography as a sexual outlet. He had not been identified as ASD yet
when the offense occurred.
Review of his academic and
developmental history, coupled with interviewing him regarding the
offense, yielded effective mitigation to provide to his lawyer a yield
that ultimately led to a sentence of probation as opposed to
incarceration.

108 See generally Jerrod Brown, Gabrea Anderson, Laura Cooney-Koss, Bethany Hastings,
Hal Pickett, Diane Neal, Julie Martindale, Kimberly D. Dodson & Leslie Barfknecht, Autism
Spectrum Disorder and Sexually Inappropriate Behaviors: An Introduction for Caregivers
and Professionals, 1 J. SPECIAL POPULATIONS 1 (2017).
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id.
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Individuals with ASD can become fixated on collecting
objects, toys or pictures.113 This pattern of behavior can easily lead to
fixating on pictures that would be inappropriate such as child
pornography whether intentional or accidental.
For example,
individuals with ASD can develop a rigid and repetitive pattern of
using the computer for playing games and leisure activities. The
accessibility of various websites including adult pornography can lead
to messages being sent through email from inappropriate websites
including child pornography sites. While the individual did not intend
to specifically seek out child pornography, they are now put in a
position in which they become targets for predators. When an
individual with ASD has lower intellectual functioning it becomes
even more important for the expert witness to explain how the
combined factors place them more at risk for actions which may be
better explained by the developmental and intellectual limitations.
Forensic psychologists can play a vital role in identifying and
explaining the presence of I/DD as it relates to criminal charges
involving sexual offenses. A comprehensive inquiry into the client’s
social, developmental, academic, medical and psychiatric history can
provide critical information in fleshing out the nature of the disability
and streamlining efforts to further diagnose relevant mitigating factors.
When an individual who is suspected of having an I/DD has not yet
been identified or diagnosed as such, selective psychological testing
including intellectual assessment (Wechsler Adult and Children’s
Intelligence Tests)114 adaptive testing (Adaptive Behavioral
Assessment Scale),115 and autism, Aspergers interviews and measures
(Gilliams Autism Rating Scale)116 can be used to further define the
disorder and make appropriate recommendations for effective
intervention.
The forensic evaluator is in a unique position to provide
appropriate input regarding mitigation and related strategies to
accomplish appropriate resolutions in the criminal justice system.
Such strategies should incorporate rehabilitation and protective
113

See, e.g., K. Gillespie-Smith, D.M. Riby, P.J.B. Hancock & G. Doherty-Sneddon,
Children with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) Attend Typically to Faces and Objects
Presented within Their Picture Communication Systems, 58 J. INTELL. DISABILITY RES. 459
(2014).
114 DAVID WECHSLER, WESCHLER ADULT INTELLIGENCE SCALE -IV (2008).
115 PATTI L HARRISON & THOMAS OAKLAND, ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR ASSESSMENT SYSTEM (2d
ed. 2000).
116 JAMES E. GILLIAM, GILLIAM AUTISM RATING SCALE (GARS-3) (3d ed. 2013).
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strategies for potential victims. Resources often exist in the
community for sentencing options that can be incorporated through a
pre-sentence plan. Advocates from support and advocacy groups such
as The Arc can collaborate with the district attorney’s office and the
probation department and present relevant and needed information to
the judge. Examples of options involving personalized justice117 are
being implemented by The Arc and include 24-48 hours incapacitation
in a safe environment along with sex/relationship training, restitution
for charges, and confinement to a residential facility for a designated
period of time. Some communities also have programs designed for
individuals with developmental disabilities including The Safer
Society Foundation Inc.118 The forensic psychologist is thus in a
unique position to utilize existing resources to forge a path within the
criminal justice system and provide creative options that accommodate
individuals with disabilities while providing legitimate sentencing
options.
V.

THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE119

One of the most important legal theoretical developments of
the past three decades has been the creation and dynamic growth of
TJ.120 TJ presents a new model for assessing the impact of case law
117

Healthcare Analytics Best Practices, DDOP (June 19, 2017), http://www.ddop.org.
Leigh Ann Davis, People with Intellectual Disability & Sexual Offenses, ARC (Aug.
2009), https://www.thearc.org/what-we-do/resources/fact-sheets/sexual-offenses.
119 Text infra accompanying notes 120-29 is generally adapted from Perlin & Lynch, supra
note 32; Naomi M. Weinstein & Michael L. Perlin, “Who’s Pretending to Care for Him?”
How the Endless Jail-to-Hospital-to-Street-Repeat Cycle Deprives Persons with Mental
Disabilities the Right to Continuity of Care, 8 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 455 (2018), and
Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, “In the Wasteland of Your Mind”: Criminology,
Scientific Discoveries and the Criminal Process, 4 VA. J. CRIM. L. 304 (2016). Further, it
distills the work of one of the co-authors over the past 25+ years beginning with Michael L.
Perlin, What Is Therapeutic Jurisprudence?, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 623 (1993). See
generally Michael L. Perlin, “Have You Seen Dignity?”: The Story of the Development of
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 27 NEW ZEALAND U. L. REV. 1135 (2017); Michael L. Perlin,
“Changing of the Guards”: David Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, and the
Transformation of Legal Scholarship, INT’L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY (forthcoming 2019).
120 See, e.g., DAVID B. WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC
AGENT (1990); DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY:
DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (1996); BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL
COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL (2005). Wexler first used the term in
a paper he presented to the National Institute of Mental Health in 1987. See David B. Wexler,
Putting Mental Health into Mental Health Law: Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 16 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 27, 27, 32-33 (1992); David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence Forum: The
Development of Therapeutic Jurisprudence: From Theory to Practice, 68 REV. JUR. U.P.R.
118
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and legislation, recognizing that, as a therapeutic agent, the law can
have therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences.121
Therapeutic jurisprudence asks whether legal rules,
procedures, and lawyer roles can or should be reshaped to enhance
their therapeutic potential while not subordinating due process
principles.122 David Wexler clearly identifies how the tension inherent
in this inquiry must be resolved: the law’s use of “mental health
information to improve therapeutic functioning [cannot] impinge upon
justice concerns.”123 Such an inquiry into therapeutic outcomes does
not mean that “therapeutic concerns ‘trump’ civil rights and civil
liberties.”124
Using TJ, we “look at law as it actually impacts people’s
lives”125 and assess law’s influence on emotional life and
psychological well-being.126 One governing TJ principle is that “law
should value psychological health, should strive to avoid imposing
anti-therapeutic consequences whenever possible, and when consistent

691, 693-94 (1999). See generally David B. Wexler, Mental Health Law and the Seeds of
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in THE ROOTS OF MODERN PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: A NARRATIVE
HISTORY 78 (Thomas Grisso & Stanley Brodsky eds., 2018).
121 See Michael L. Perlin, “His Brain Has Been Mismanaged with Great Skill”: How Will
Jurors Respond to Neuroimaging Testimony in Insanity Defense Cases?, 42 AKRON L. REV.
885, 912 (2009).
122 Perlin, supra note 47; Michael L. Perlin, “And My Best Friend, My Doctor, Won’t Even
Say What It Is I’ve Got”: The Role and Significance of Counsel in Right to Refuse Treatment
Cases, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735, 751 (2005). See also Ian Freckelton, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence Misunderstood and Misrepresented: The Price and Risks of Influence, 30
THOMAS JEFFERSON L. REV. 575, 585-86 (2008).
123 David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Changing Conceptions of Legal
Scholarship, 11 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 17, 21 (1993). See also David B. Wexler, Applying the Law
Therapeutically, 5 APPLIED & PREV. PSYCHOL. 179 (1996).
124 Michael L. Perlin, A Law of Healing, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 407, 412 (2000); Michael L.
Perlin, “Where the Winds Hit Heavy on the Borderline”: Mental Disability Law, Theory and
Practice, “Us” and “Them”, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 775, 782 (1998).
125 Bruce J. Winick, Foreword: Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspectives on Dealing With
Victims of Crime, 33 NOVA L. REV. 535, 535 (2009).
126 David B. Wexler, Practicing Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Psycholegal Soft Spots and
Strategies, in DANIEL P. STOLLE, DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, PRACTICING
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A HELPING PROFESSION 45 (2006).
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with other values served by law, should attempt to bring about healing
and wellness.”127 TJ supports an ethic of care.128
Professor Amy Ronner describes the “three Vs”: voice,
validation and voluntariness and argues:
What “the three Vs” commend is pretty basic:
litigants must have a sense of voice or a chance to tell
their story to a decision maker. If that litigant feels that
the tribunal has genuinely listened to, heard, and taken
seriously the litigant’s story, the litigant feels a sense of
validation. When litigants emerge from a legal
proceeding with a sense of voice and validation, they
are more at peace with the outcome. Voice and
validation create a sense of voluntary participation, one
in which the litigant experiences the proceeding as less
coercive. Specifically, the feeling on the part of litigants
that they voluntarily partook in the very process that
engendered the end result or the very judicial
pronunciation that affects their own lives can initiate
healing and bring about improved behavior in the
future. In general, human beings prosper when they feel
that they are making, or at least participating in, their
own decisions.129
The question to be posed here is this: does our current system
comply with these precepts of therapeutic jurisprudence? Consider the
range of topics that one must consider when one thinks about patient
sexuality: sterilization, the special circumstances of forensic facilities,
medication side effects, sex education, sexual interaction when one or
both participants have irreversible neurological deficits, institutional
placements, institutional conditions, and reproductive technologies
and rights.130 In each instance, an evaluation of our findings in the

127

Bruce J. Winick, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Model for Civil Commitment, in
INVOLUNTARY DETENTION AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
ON CIVIL COMMITMENT 23, 26 (Kate Diesfeld & Ian Freckelton eds., 2003).
128 See, e.g., Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler, The Use of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in
Law School Clinical Education: Transforming the Criminal Law Clinic, 13 CLINICAL L. REV.
605, 605-07 (2006).
129 Ronner, supra note 84, at 94-95 (footnotes omitted); see also Amy D. Ronner, The
Learned-Helpless Lawyer: Clinical Legal Education and Therapeutic Jurisprudence as
Antidotes to the Bartleby Syndrome, 24 TOURO L. REV. 601, 627 (2008).
130 See generally PERLIN & LYNCH, supra note 5.
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context of Professor Ronner’s TJ prescriptions would show that our
policies fail miserably (a finding that should not surprise us terribly,
given the legal system’s long-standing and well-documented woeful
track record of comporting with therapeutic jurisprudence in many of
these areas).131
TJ allows for several end goals: it targets sanism, sets up a legal
system where the therapeutic benefit of legal solutions is not just
discussed but actually made to be a targeted outcome, and teaches
attorneys and judges how to appropriately interact with individuals
with mental disabilities in all types of representation. We believe that
it is a meaningful and critical solution to the problems faced by both
new and veteran attorneys in the realm of mental health litigation and
counseling. Its precepts offer a radically different perspective on the
provision of counsel—whether the case is a civil commitment case,
institutional reform case, criminal case, or even a civil case that, on its
surface, appears to have nothing to do with “mental disability law.” TJ
is and can be a way to implement positive psychology in the litigational
relationship,132 and can be a critically important tool of persuasion in
all aspects of the lawyer/client relationship, case negotiations, and the
courtroom process.133 TJ provides a ready-made tool kit for lawyers
representing this population, in that it allows and encourages them to
focus on the critical concepts of voluntariness, voice, and validation.
A great deal of advocacy can be done using the tools of
therapeutic jurisprudence, but attorneys first need to accept it as a part
of their practice, and then embrace it as a way of bringing a different
approach to traditional lawyering. This will help to ensure that
attorneys are truly doing as much zealous advocacy as possible for
their client, despite what may be seen initially as discomfort based on
the subject matter.
Finally, consider the roots of the dilemmas we face: our
attitudes towards the sexual autonomy of persons with mental
disabilities, especially those who are institutionalized.134 The TJ
implications of these attitudes should be crystal-clear to all of us. But
131

See id. at 145-57.
See Perlin & Lynch, supra note 26, at 300.
133 Id.
134 See, e.g., Heather Ellis Cucolo & Michael L. Perlin, Preventing Sex-Offender Recidivism
Through Therapeutic Jurisprudence Approaches and Specialized Community Integration, 22
TEMP. POL. & CIVIL RTS. L. REV. 1, 41 (2012) (“TJ instructs us to step back from myths and
prevailing attitudes and to carefully consider the prescriptions of therapeutic jurisprudence
principles.”).
132
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when MLP and AJL wrote a book-length treatment of all these issues,
we were stunned to discover that a whole array of collateral issues—
the weight of historical attitudes, the continuing power of religiosity in
the creation of policies, how we view sexualization and
desexualization, how we assess sexuality/sexual desire in older adults,
attitudes of hospital staffs, medical professionals and patient
advocates—had never been previously considered from a TJ
perspective. We devoted much of our book to that reality, and we are
hoping that we inspire others to do the same.
A decade ago, MLP said this:
In the past four decades, a sexual revolution
changed the way we think about gender, sex roles,
personal relationships, and sexual expression. The last
thirty years have seen a legal civil-rights revolution
affect the way that we think about persons with mental
disabilities, both in institutional and community
settings. The last twenty years have seen a revolution in
the joining together of the international human-rights
movement and the mental disability law movement.
Perhaps we can now turn our attention to the
relationship between these two revolutions. 135
The three of us still hold this sentiment as true today. Through
advocacy, understanding and implementation of principles consistent
with TJ, this area of law and policy can and must continue in the wake
of so many other successes for the rights of individuals with mental
disabilities.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Before we conclude, some related thoughts. Over twenty years
ago, writing about civil commitment law, right to treatment law and
right to refuse treatment law, writing with others, MLP said, “[W]e
believe that therapeutic jurisprudence analyses may be a strategy to
redeem civil rights litigation in this area and to reinvigorate this body

135

Perlin, supra note 47, at 511-12. On the relationship between the Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities and sexualities, see Felipe Jaramillo Ruiz, The Committee
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Its Take on Sexuality, 25 REPRODUCTIVE
HEALTH MATTERS 92 (2017).
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of mental disability law.”136 A few years later, this thought was
expanded to argue that TJ “carries with it the potential to offer
redemption for all mental disability law,”137 and then, yet later, “to
redeem the law for [all] persons who have been marginalized.”138
There are no groups more marginalized than the persons about
whom we are speaking here, and this marginalization consistently
causes shame, humiliation and lack of dignity for these individuals,139
and may in turn “diminish their investment in mainstream social values
and increase their resentment toward society.”140 Writing about the
same topic, two of the co-authors have characterized the “suppression
of all sexual desire and action [as] . . . a form of social torture”141 for
individuals with disabilities who reside in institutionalized care.142 Our
hope is that this article inspires lawyers, mental health professionals,
expert witnesses, and policy makers to take seriously the ways that we
deprive persons with mental disabilities of their right to sexual
autonomy, presuming, in violation of the law, science and common
sense, that they are incompetent to do so.143 We believe that a turn to
the principles of therapeutic jurisprudence is the best way that we can
do this.
Return now to the last line of the verse from which we took our
title—“You can’t win with a losing hand.” Since time immemorial,
persons with disabilities have had a “losing hand” in this area of law
and behavior. We hope, finally, that—back to the title—times and
things truly have changed.

136 Michael L. Perlin, Keri K. Gould & Deborah A. Dorfman, Therapeutic Jurisprudence
and the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Mentally Disabled Persons: Hopeless Oxymoron or
Path to Redemption?, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 80, 84 (1995).
137 Perlin, supra note 1, at 544.
138 Perlin & Douard, supra note 25, at 14.
139 See generally Perlin & Weinstein, supra note 102.
140
Jill S. Levenson, David A. D’Amora & Andrea L. Hern, Megan’s Law and Its Impact
on Community Re-Entry for Sex Offenders, 25 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 587, 598 (2007).
141 Perlin & Lynch, supra note 32, at 262.
142 See Chin, supra note 18, at 381.
143 In a recent piece, Professor Jasmine Harris refers to “the urgency of [this] conversation.”
Harris, supra note 31, at 557.
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